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Abstract—  Price dispersion, i.e. a homogeneous 
product sold at different prices by different sellers, is 
among the most replicated findings in empirical 
economics. The paper assesses the extent and 
determinants of spatial price dispersion for 14 perfectly 
homogeneous food products in more than 400 retailers 
in a market characterized by the persistence of a large 
number of relatively small traditional food stores, side 
by side with large supermarkets. The extent of observed 
price dispersion is quite high, suggesting that, despite 
their large number, monopolistic competition prevails 
among sellers as a result of the heterogeneity of services 
offered. When prices in an urban area (where the spatial 
concentration of sellers is much higher and consumer 
search costs significantly lower) have been compared 
with those in smaller towns and rural areas, differences 
in search costs and the potentially higher degree of 
competition did not yield lower prices; quite the 
contrary, they were, on average, higher for 11 of the 14 
products considered. Supermarkets proved to be often, 
but not always, less expensive than traditional retailers, 
although average savings associated to food shopping at 
supermarkets were extremely low. Finally, the results of 
the study suggest that sellers behave differently in their 
pricing decision strategies; these differences emerge 
both at the firm level and, for supermarkets, within the 
same chain. The fact that products considered were 
homogeneous, purchases frequently repeated, the 
number of sellers large, and search costs relatively low, 
did not suffice to keep price dispersion low. Based on the 
results presented in the paper, it is clear that more 
important in explaining price dispersion is the 
contemporaneous heterogeneity of retailers (in terms of 
services rendered) and consumers (in terms of their 
propensity to search and shopping preferences), which 
makes it possible for a monopolistic competition 
structure of the market to emerge and for small 
traditional food retail stores to remain in business.   
 
Keywords— Price dispersion, retail pricing, food 
markets. 
JEL classification— L81; D8; D4; Q13. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The existence of price dispersion, even for   
homogeneous products, is among the most replicated 
findings in empirical economics. After Stigler’s (1961) 
seminal paper, a rich literature flourished, both 
theoretical and empirical, analyzing the causes and 
consequences of such “ubiquitous”  price dispersion.
1  
The paper aims to contribute to the empirical 
literature by assessing the extent and determinants of 
spatial price dispersion for 14 perfectly homogeneous 
food products. We found only two studies addressing 
price dispersion for food products in Europe (Lloyd et 
al., 2009; Griffith et al., 2009). In addition, to the best 
of our knowledge, our study is the only one conducted 
in a market characterized by the strong persistence of 
traditional food retailers (i.e. small shops specializing 
in selling one specific category of food products only, 
such as bread, fresh fruit and vegetables, fish, meat, 
etc).  
In addition to measuring the extent of price 
dispersion, the paper attempts to answer several 
questions related to its determinants which emerge 
from the alternative theoretical models proposed in the 
literature. These questions include: How relevant are 
promotional sales in explaining spatial price 
dispersion? How important is seller heterogeneity in 
explaining price dispersion, e.g. are consumer prices 
higher in traditional food retailers than in 
supermarkets? Is price dispersion greater in 
supermarkets than in traditional small stores? Is price 
dispersion within each supermarket chain smaller than 
across all supermarkets? Are prices and price 
dispersion higher in smaller towns and rural 
communities, where search costs can be assumed to be 
                                                           
1 Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2006) provide a survey of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on price dispersion.    2 
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higher, than in urban settings? Do low/high price 
setters remain so over time?  
We believe the results of our study may be relevant 
for more general frameworks characterized by 
perfectly homogeneous, well known products, 
involving frequently repeated purchases, with 
relatively low unit prices, sold by a large number of 
heterogeneous stores and bought by a large number of 
heterogeneous consumers. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section 
briefly recalls the main theories which have been 
proposed to explain price dispersion; section three 
provides an overview of relevant empirical 
contributions assessing the extent and determinants of 
price dispersion; section four presents the results of 
our study and section five concludes by discussing 
their implications and relevance. 
II. WHY PRICE DISPERSION?  
There is no unique explanation of why price 
dispersion arises. Many studies agree that a good 
portion of observed price dispersion stems from the 
existence of information (search) costs.  In his seminal 
paper Stigler (1961) considers price dispersion as a 
measure of ignorance in the market: nobody can 
possibly know all the prices quoted by different sellers 
at any given time, and any agent who wishes to 
ascertain the lowest price must do a search that 
involves a cost. In his model consumers search 
strategy consists in canvassing a fixed sample of n 
firms and then buying at the minimum asking price. 
The optimal amount of search n* is determined a 
priori and corresponds to the number of firms which 
makes the cost of search equal to its expected marginal 
return; it varies among individuals mostly because of 
differences in search costs. The persistence of price 
dispersion has been explained in different ways: first 
of all, the fact that knowledge becomes obsolete as 
supply and demand, and therefore the distribution of 
asking prices, change over time;  buyers and sellers 
change and new agents enter the market with no prior 
information on prices; finally, the circumstance that, 
as the market grows, there is a strong tendency 
towards monopoly in the provision of information. 
Rothschild (1973) criticizes Stigler’s model as a 
“partial-partial equilibrium theory” (p. 1288), in the 
sense that he considers only one side of the market, the 
consumers, acting in an optimizing fashion, while 
firms do not make an optimal use of the information 
they possess, because in Stigler, although price setters 
know how buyers search, they do not make use of this 
information in their decision making.  
Notwithstanding the fact that Stigler denies that all 
price dispersion is attributable to heterogeneity, the 
literature expanding on his theory mostly focuses on 
models with varying search and production costs as 
factors generating the dispersion. Representative 
examples include Burdett and Judd (1983), Carlson 
and McAfee (1983), Salop (1977), Salop and Stiglitz 
(1977), and Stahl (1989). Carlson and  McAfee (1983) 
develop an equilibrium price dispersion model where a 
finite number of firms differ in their cost functions and 
consumers have different search costs. The predictions 
of the model are that the variance of prices rises as the 
number of firms increases, as the marginal cost curve 
becomes flatter, or when the cumulative density 
distribution of consumer search costs shifts downward. 
Salop and Stiglitz (1977) consider a market with both 
“low information cost” consumers, who are supposed 
to have full information regarding the distribution of 
offered prices, and “high information cost” consumers, 
who know nothing about it. The former always 
purchase from a low-priced store, while the latter 
purchase at a randomly chosen store. Stores are 
identical and behave as monopolistically competitive 
price setters. It is shown that in equilibrium every 
store earns zero profits, for prices must equal average 
costs, and high-priced stores sell a smaller quantity 
than lower-priced ones. Low-priced stores sell at the 
competitive price (minimum average cost), while the 
other stores sell at a higher price and only to 
uninformed consumers. Stahl (1989) focuses on the 
case where there are two types of consumers about 
whom stores have no individual information: a 
proportion  of consumers, named “shoppers”, derive 
enjoyment from shopping and are assumed to be 
costless searchers; the remaining proportion 1 -  of 
consumers have an identical positive search cost c. N 
identical stores with constant marginal costs compete 
in the market of a homogeneous good. A two-stage 
model is considered, where in the first stage each store 
fixes the price and in the second stage consumers 
adopt an optimal sequential strategy with perfect 
recall. When  =1 and  = 0 the marginal cost price 
(Betrand result) and monopolistic price (Diamond 
result), respectively, occur. As  goes from 0 to 1 and 
the search cost goes from c to 0 there is a Nash 
equilibrium price distribution that smoothly moves 
from “monopoly pricing” to “marginal cost pricing”. 
Moreover, in this model, as in Carlson and McAfee   3 
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(1983), entry does not lead to a competitive outcome, 
the reason here being that, as the number of stores 
increases, the probability of any one of them being the 
lowest-priced store decreases, thus reducing the 
incentive for lowering the price. In terms of welfare 
analysis, as pricing becomes more monopolistic, 
“shoppers” are better off while consumers with a 
positive search cost are worse off. The overall effect 
depends on the size of  and it may be the case that  
total welfare decreases when the number of stores 
rises.  
When consumers are heterogeneous in their search 
behaviors and exhibit different efficiencies in 
gathering information, a further reason for price 
dispersion arises, that is firms behaving as 
discriminating monopolists. In this case price 
dispersion acts as a device for splitting the market in 
two, with more efficient information gatherers, on one 
side, and less efficient ones on the other. Thus, 
monopolists can charge the latter, who are supposed to 
have a more price inelastic demand function, a higher 
price (Salop 1977). 
The literature on price dispersion contemplates four 
different typologies of consumer search strategies: 
Stigler (1961), Burdett and Judd (1983), Mac Minn 
(1980), Wilde and Schwartz (1979), among others, 
consider a “fixed sample size” consumer search, while 
Diamond (1971), Carlson and McAfee (1983), 
Reinganum (1979) and Stahl (1989), to quote some, 
assume “sequential” consumer search; Burdett and 
Judd (1983) consider also a noisy sequential search; 
finally, Rosenthal (1980), Varian (1980) and Baye and 
Morgan (2001) propose models with “information 
clearinghouse”. In a fixed sample size search   
consumers decide the number of prices to observe 
prior to starting their search, so the problem is to 
determine how many price quotations it is efficient to 
collect. In a sequential search  consumers observe a 
price quotation and then decide whether to ask for 
another price quotation or make the purchase at the 
lowest price observed up to then. In a noisy sequential 
search consumers pay a cost to obtain an unknown 
number of price quotations, as happens when 
consumers purchase a newspaper in which they know 
they will surely find one price of the good they want to 
buy, but it is possible that the newspaper contains 
more than one firm’s price quotation. After collecting 
the price(s) provided in the newspaper the consumer 
either purchases at the lowest price observed, or 
decides to keep searching and buys another 
newspaper. An information clearinghouse search 
technique consists in observing an extensive list of 
prices charged by different firms in the market by 
means of specialized newspapers or on-line websites.  
Stigler’s fixed sample size rule has been criticized 
as unrealistic, because it implies that the information 
consumers accumulate during the search does not 
affect their decision to canvass all the sample chosen 
ex ante (Rothshild, 1973). As a consequence, several 
authors point out that a more appropriate assumption 
regarding consumer search strategy is a sequential 
one. Morgan and Manning (1985), Burdett and Judd 
(1983) and Wilde and Schwartz (1983) show, 
however, that both types of search can be optimal: the 
key advantage of a fixed sample search is to collect 
the price for the number of firms decided a priori at 
the same time, hence gathering the information 
quickly; on the contrary, a sequential search would be 
more efficient when the acceptable price could be 
found early in the search, allowing consumers to 
economize on information search costs (otherwise it 
could take a significant amount of time waiting for 
each new price quotation before deciding whether or 
not to search further, with the consequent increase in 
search costs). 
In line with Stigler’s insight, other contributions 
consider price dispersion as endogenously generated. 
Indeed, Varian (1980) presents a model in which price 
dispersion is due to the randomization behavior 
adopted by identical firms and shows how consumer 
information asymmetries, initially considered as 
exogenous, can be made endogenous. He distinguishes 
between “spatial” price dispersion - e.g. different 
stores contemporaneously offering identical items at 
different prices - and  “temporal” price dispersion - 
e.g. stores varying their selling price for a given 
commodity over time, for example by means of 
promotional sales. He argues that the former may exist 
only if the latter occurs. In fact, with temporal price 
dispersion consumers are unable to learn from 
experience which stores systematically charge low 
prices, and spatial price dispersion would be unlikely 
to persist if consumers could learn from experience 
which firms charge the lowest prices. In the Salop and 
Stiglitz (1982) model all individuals are ex ante 
identical, and imperfect and costly information, due to 
the functioning of the market, is at the center of the 
analysis. By chance, some consumers happen to shop 
at low-price stores, while others shop at high-priced 
stores; they randomly select a store in period 1, so 
whether they pay a good price or not depends only on 
the luck of the draw. It is assumed that consumers   4 
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have the possibility of starting a new search at period 
2. Consumer demand one unit of the good each period, 
but may either purchase just one unit in period 1, 
facing an additional transaction cost in re-entering the 
market in period 2; or they may decide to purchase 
two units in period 1 and store the unit in excess of the 
immediate consumption for the next period, incurring 
a storage cost. The decision to buy-and-store or shop 
again stems from the comparison of these two options. 
High-price stores earn higher profits per sale, but low 
price stores realize a higher volume of sales. 
Equilibrium price dispersion entails equal profits for 
the two types of stores, i.e. the larger volume of sales 
of low-price stores exactly compensates for the larger 
profit per sale of high-price stores. Burdett and Judd 
(1983) show that price dispersion may exist 
independent from any form of ex ante agent 
heterogeneity. Considering identical and fully rational 
consumers and firms, they show that for equilibrium 
price dispersion an ex post heterogeneity in consumer 
information is crucial, that is a divergence in the 
amount of information each consumer holds after 
searching. They demonstrate that a dispersed price 
equilibrium can exist both with noisy and non 
sequential searches.  
Finally, there are alternative theoretical approaches 
to price dispersion which do not consider consumer 
search costs as the main determinant, but rather stress 
the importance of heterogeneity in consumers and/or 
firms instead in generating price dispersion. 
Frequently cited factors other than search costs 
include: price discrimination in the presence of 
consumers who do not engage in searches, regardless 
of cost; heterogeneity of retailers in terms of the 
quantity and quality of services offered, e.g. opening 
hours, cleanliness, number of references to choose 
from, location and/or parking convenience, credit 
cards being accepted, store layout to reduce shopping 
time, delays at check-out; trust/reputation; degree of 
competition; promotional sales; and bounded 
rationality of consumers and/or firms. 
III. PRICE DISPERSION IN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSES  
Empirical evidence of spatial price dispersion has 
been found in virtually all markets which have been 
investigated, including automobiles (Dahlby and West, 
1986), air travel (Borenstein and Rose, 1994), services 
(Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser, 1979), gasoline and 
products sold in gas station stores (Adams, 1997), 
books and CDs (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Clay 
et al, 1999; Clay, Krishnan and Wolff, 2001), scanners 
and digital cameras (Baylis and Perloff, 2002), and 
prescription drugs (Sorensen, 2000).  
Dahlby and West (1986) find that price dispersion 
in automobile insurance in Alberta increases with 
competition and could be explained by the cost of 
consumer search. Borenstein and Rose (1994) analyze 
air fares charged in 1986 by the 11 major U.S. airlines 
for coach seating to passengers traveling domestically 
on the same routes. The expected absolute difference 
in fares between two passengers on the same route was 
36 percent of the average ticket price for that route. 
Fare dispersion turned out to be smaller across carriers 
relative to dispersion across customers of the same 
carrier. Considering thirty-nine products and services, 
for which, on average, twelve price quotations in the 
Boston area were collected, Pratt, Wise and 
Zeckhauser (1979) gathered evidence of notable price 
dispersion. Adams (1997) finds that price dispersion 
for gasoline was significantly lower than that for 22 
items sold by convenience stores located on the same 
premises. Because search costs for consumers of 
gasoline are lower than those for in-store items (prices 
for gasoline are prominently displayed and easily 
visible), he concludes that the observed differences in 
price dispersion support the hypothesis that different 
search and information costs for consumers explain a 
sizable portion of price dispersion for homogeneous 
goods. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) consider book 
and CD prices offered by Internet and conventional 
retailers; they find Internet retailer price ranges of 33 
percent for books and 25 percent for CDs (for some 
books and CD the range is as much as 47 percent), 
with price dispersion among Internet retailers being 
smaller than that among conventional ones. Clay et al. 
(1999) find substantial price dispersion across 13 
online bookstores, with the average difference 
between the minimum and maximum price for 
paperback bestsellers being 73 percent. Clay, Krishnan 
and Wolff (2001) find a similar result when analyzing 
32 online bookstores. Baylis and Perloff (2002) found 
significant price dispersion in offers by 49 Internet 
retailers for a digital camera and a scanner; the price 
range was 42 percent of the average price for the 
camera and 29 percent for the scanner. Their study 
shows that, contrary to expectations, retailers charging 
high prices provided fewer services; this is consistent 
with differences in firm pricing strategies explained by 
targeting consumers with high or low search costs.   5 
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They (and others) also find that firms do not take turns 
in undercutting each other, i.e. the high-priced firms 
remain high-priced and low-priced firms remain low-
priced over long periods. Sorensen (2000) focuses on 
the retail market for prescription drugs and finds that 
prices for equivalent prescriptions differ substantially 
across pharmacies within the same small town, with 
the highest price being, on average, 50 percent higher 
than the lowest one. Differences in service 
characteristics turn out to be relatively unhelpful in 
explaining price differences. Moreover, pharmacies 
price rankings differ from one drug to another, with 
price dispersion significantly lower for prescriptions 
used for drugs used to treat chronic conditions, which 
are purchased repeatedly.  
Research has systematically found that significant 
price dispersion exists even in on-line markets, where 
search costs can be assumed to be very low (Baye and 
Morgan 2001; Baye, Morgan and Scholten, 2003; 
Nermuth  et al., 2009; Clay et al., 1999; Clay, 
Krishnan and Wolff, 2001; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 
2000; Baylis and Perloff, 2002).  
Several studies addressed the extent and 
determinants of price dispersion with specific 
reference to food products. Ambrose (1979) analyzed 
prices for 54 grocery products in 6 small independent 
stores, 4 large independent stores and in 4 stores 
belonging to a chain, located in inner city, suburban 
and rural areas in Nebraska. He found prices to be 
higher in small independent stores and in stores 
located in rural areas. Lloyd et al. (2009) use a very 
detailed data base of weekly observed prices of over 
1,700 grocery products sold in the seven largest retail 
chains in the UK to address the role of promotional 
sales in price variability over time. They conclude that 
the influence of promotional sales on price variation 
across the chains is modest, explaining at most 29 
percent of price variability. Significant price 
dispersion across the seven chains they focus on 
emerges from the study; even after excluding discount 
sales, the average difference in the prices of products 
carrying the same bar code is about 25 percent. 
Griffith et al. (2009) use information on purchases of 
food products by 25,000 families in Great Britain over 
the 2006 calendar year to analyze four dimensions of 
their buying behaviors aimed at containing their 
spending: purchasing products on sale, generic brands, 
and in bulk, and choosing where to buy. They show 
that potential and actual savings from these four 
sources are significant. In Israel Lach (2002) found 
price dispersion for four products (three of them food: 
frozen chicken, coffee and flour) to be significant and 
to prevail even after controlling for unobserved 
product heterogeneity. Temporal price dispersion 
within stores was significant; most stores were 
observed to have the lowest and the highest price over 
the length (48 months) of the sample period. Stores 
moving up and down the cross sectional price 
distribution implies that consumers cannot learn about 
stores that consistently post lower prices; this is a 
condition for price dispersion to persist. Pesendorfer 
(2002) analyzes prices of two market leader ketch-ups 
in 21 supermarkets in Springfield, Missouri over a two 
year period. Prices of Heinz and Hunt’s 32 ounce 
bottles both show substantial price dispersion on a 
given day, with the lowest price being about 30 
percent below the average one. Sexton, Zhang and 
Chalfant (2003) address retailer behavior in 
procurement and sale by 20 grocery chains in six U.S. 
metropolitan markets focusing on fresh produce 
(iceberg lettuce, fresh tomatoes and bagged salads). 
They conclude that retailers do exert oligopoly power 
in setting prices to consumers, but not to the full extent 
available to them as a result of geographical 
dispersion, brand differentiation and inelastic 
consumer demands; in addition, no evidence emerged 
of price setting by retailers. Hosken and Reiffen 
(2004) consider monthly prices of 20 food products in 
30 U.S. metropolitan areas for up to 5 years. They 
conclude that grocery products typically have a 
“regular” price and stay at that price at least 50% of 
the time, most of the deviations from the regular price 
are downward and promotional sales account for 20 to 
50 percent of observed annual price variability. 
Devine and Marion (1979) conducted an experiment 
by providing for five weeks through daily newspapers 
consumers in the Ottawa-Hull area with information 
on prices for sixty-five food products in twenty-six 
local stores. When compared with price developments 
in a control area, the provision of consumers with low 
cost information on prices induced a decline of the 
level and dispersion of an aggregate price index across 
stores as well as within chains. 
Contrary to expectations, price dispersion is not to 
be observed across retailers only, but within stores as 
well. Quantity surcharges, i.e. the per unit price of a 
brand’s larger package being higher (rather than 
lower) than the per unit price of the same brand’s 
smaller package, occurs more frequently than one 
would expect. Sprott, Manning and Miyazaki (2003) 
cite research which found quantity surcharges in 16 to   6 
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34 percent of grocery supermarket brand products 
available in more than one package size. 
IV. RESULTS  
The analysis is based on the results of a survey of 
retail prices for 14 food items in 437 stores located in 
towns and cities of different demographic sizes in 
Calabria, a region in Southern Italy. The list of the 14 
food items is given in table 1; they are all processed 
products, univocally identified by their brand, 
packaging and volume/size. The survey was conducted 
between April  8 and 11, 2010.  
The sample covers 10% of the 4,350 food retail 
stores operating in Calabria in 2001, at the time of the 
most recent Italian Census of Manufacture and 
Services; because of the historical trend towards a 
rapid reduction of food retail stores, it is reasonable to 
assume that the survey coverage of the population of 
active retail stores in 2010 is significantly larger than 
10%. 57% of the stores in the sample are supermarkets 
(including very large ones, sometimes referred to as 
“hypermarkets”), the remaining 43% are traditional 
retail stores. Small traditional retailers (specialized 
food shops in which the seller handles the items) are 
26% of the stores in the sample, while 17% are 
“superettes” (relatively small shops in which buyers 
have the freedom to pick most of the items from the 
shelves). Supermarkets are over-represented in the 
sample with respect to their consistency in the 2001 
Census (5.1%), and traditional retail stores under-
represented.  
In total, 4,149 prices are used in the analysis; the 
number varies between 193 (MILKTDM) and 386 
(NUTELLA), as not all products were sold in every 
retail store (Table 2). 
A. How much price dispersion? 
Based on the specific characteristics of the products 
- perfectly homogeneous, well known to consumers 
and frequently purchased -  and markets - relatively 
low search costs, because of the high number of sellers 
- considered in this study, theory explaining price 
variability by assigning a key role to search costs and 
product heterogeneity would lead us to expect a 
relatively low level of spatial price dispersion. 
However, empirical research conducted in contexts 
very different from the one analyzed here has found 
food products characterized by a significant degree of 
price dispersion.  
The results of our survey for the entire sample are 
presented in table 2 and figures 1-3. The ratio between 
the maximum and minimum prices for the 14 products 
ranges between 1.45 (MILKGRA) and 2.96 
(SPAGBAR) and exceeds 2 for 7 out of the 14 
products (table 2; figure1). The significantly lower 
price dispersion for MILKGRA is due to the fact that 
during the week of the survey the manufacturer 
distributed it with a “suggested” promotional retail 
price clearly displayed on the label; in fact, the 
“suggested” sale price was the observed  retail price in 
294 stores out of the 353 selling that specific brand of 
milk. 
The coefficient of variation - which provides a 
measure of variability which is independent of the 
magnitude of the price and, as a result, is directly 
comparable across products – varies between 4.8% 
(MILKGRA) and 23.5% (YOG); it exceeds 10% in 11 
cases (table 2; figure 2).  
From the results of our survey we conclude that the 
extent of the observed spatial price dispersion is fairly 
large. Our results appear to be of the same order of 
magnitude as those reported for a range of different 
food products in Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2006; 
table  1, pp. 325-330), Degeratu, Rangaswamy and 
Wu (2000), Lach (2002) and Pesendorfer (2002).  
Price dispersion and its variability around the trend 
both tend to decline as the average price of the food 
item increases (figure 3); this is likely the result of two 
interlinked reasons: as the average price increases, the 
same coefficient of variation yields wider absolute 
differences in prices, which become more easily 
detectable by consumers and, most important, more 
significant in terms of their effect on consumers 
expenditure, increasing their willingness to search.
 In 
other words, seller pricing decisions appear to assume 
consumers are more concerned with absolute 
differences in prices than percentage ones.
2  
Not only does price dispersion differ across 
products, but the shape of price distribution appears 
dissimilar as well (figure 4). Four types of 
distributions emerge. The first one is associated to one 
product only, MILKGRA, which, for the reasons 
discussed above, shows much less price dispersion 
than all other products, with a very marked 
concentration of observed prices around the 
                                                           
2  A moderate negative relation between the coefficient of 
variation and the price of the products and services they 
considered has been found by Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser 
(1979) and Lach (2002).   7 
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“suggested” sale price, and few prices above it. The 
second type of price dispersion is associated to a 
clearly negative-asymmetric frequency distribution of 
prices, with the mode interval lying on the right of the 
one containing the average; this type of spatial price 
dispersion involves 9 of the 14 products. This result is 
consistent with the findings by Hosken and Reiffen 
(2004), Griffith et al. (2009), Li, Sexton and Xia 
(2006) and Pesendorfer (2002); they analyzed 
temporal price dispersion in different countries for 
different food products and all conclude that their 
prices typically show a “regular” price, which can be 
observed for a relatively long period of time, with 
most of the deviations being downward from this price 
and occurring for relatively short periods. The third 
type of distribution is associated to three products 
(NUTELLA, WATERLEV and SPAGVOI) and shows 
a relatively symmetric distribution of prices around the 
average. Finally, the price distribution of YOG 
appears different from all the others, with a large 
number of prices falling in the modal interval and an 
even larger number of prices falling in intervals on its 
right; 111 retailers out of 285 sell YOG at the same 
price (0.99€), possibly revealing a temporary low price 
retail strategy by the manufacturer.  
If instead of analyzing the dispersion of the price of 
each product, the dispersion of the cost of the basket 
of all products analyzed is considered, dispersion 
drops significantly, signalling that retail stores 
strategically price the products they sell differently, 
choosing to price some of them below, and others 
above the average. This is consistent with a strategy 
aimed at making it difficult for consumers to identify 
which stores are selling at prices above average 
(because they would then decide to shop elsewhere) 
and, at the same time, setting a large number of prices 
at or above average (in order to guarantee the expected 
returns). There are only 15 retail sores in the sample 
selling all 14 items. If the analysis is extended to the 
sub-samples of retail stores selling the same basket of 
13, 12, 11 and 10 products, choosing in all instances 
the set of products which maximizes the number of 
retail stores selling them, the ratios between the 
maximum and minimum cost of the basket vary 
between 1.15 and 1.21, while coefficients of variation 
remain for all 5 baskets below 5% (table 3).   
B. How relevant are promotional sales in explaining 
spatial price dispersion? 
One of the factors which can explain price 
dispersion are promotional sales, which retailers, most 
often supermarkets, use to attract new customers 
and/or retain current ones. Lloyd et al. (2009) 
analyzed average prices in 7 main food retail chains in 
the UK over three years to conclude that sales have a 
significant but relatively modest role, smaller than that 
played by the retailer, in explaining price dispersion; 
overall sales explain 13% of price variability, with 
percentages for individual food product aggregates 
varying between 2% and 29%. In Hosken and Reiffen 
(2004) sales account for a larger percentage (20% to 
50%) of annual price variations. 
12 out of the 14 products considered in our survey 
were at the time of the survey on promotional sale in 
at least one of the stores; in fact, the number of stores 
offering the products considered as a promotional sale 
varies between 0 (MILKTDM and SPAGVOI) and 
294 (MILKGRA). If we exclude MILKGRA, in 49 of 
the 437 retail stores at least one of the remaining 13 
products was offered on a promotional sale; in 18 of 
them there were at least two on special offer. The 
largest number of stores offering the product “on sale” 
is observed for MILKPARM (24) and YOG (22). 
Surprisingly enough, only in 5 cases was the lowest of 
the prices advertised as a special promotional sale the 
minimum observed price for that product; most of the 
times (in 7 cases out of 12) there were few retail stores 
selling the same item at a price below the minimum 
observed “on sale” price without highlighting that 
price as being a special offer. This seems to suggest a 
bounded rationality framework for the behaviour of at 
least some of the firms. If MILKGRA is excluded 
from the analysis, a positive linkage exists between the 
stores offering the product as a promotional sale as a 
percentage of the total number of stores selling that 
product, and the coefficient of variation of the price of 
the same product (figure 5). On the contrary, if 
MILKGRA is included, clear evidence emerges for a 
linkage in the opposite direction. We thus conclude 
that promotional sales, if driven by a market-wide 
promotion by the producer have a lowering effect on 
price dispersion, while the contrary is true if they are 
the result of decisions taken at the retail level.   8 
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C. Are consumer prices higher in supermarkets than 
in traditional food retailers? 
A specific characteristic of the market which is the 
focus of this study is the significant persistence of a 
large number of traditional, relatively small, food 
retailers. Because of their higher acquisition prices 
and, likely, operational costs with respect to those of 
supermarkets, traditional retail stores are expected to 
show higher retail prices. Ambrose (1979) found 
grocery prices to be, on average, lower in chain stores 
than in independent ones, and in large independent 
stores lower than in small ones. Our survey confirms 
this expectation: shopping at supermarkets is often, 
though not always, cheaper than in traditional stores 
(table 4; figures 6 and 7).  
The highest price is observed in a traditional store 
for 6 out of the 14 products and in a supermarket for 2 
products (the maximum price is the same in the two 
groups of stores for the remaining 6 products). 
Supermarkets show the lowest observed price for 8 of 
the 14 products; for three products this is the case for 
traditional stores, while in the remaining three the 
minimum price in the two groups of stores is the same. 
The average price is lower in supermarkets for 11 
products, but two products were cheaper in traditional 
retail stores.  
The statistical significance of the difference 
between average prices in supermarkets and traditional 
retail stores has been tested by estimating by OLS for 














i is the price of the k-th product in the i-th 
store, D
k
i is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
store is a traditional retailer, 0 if it is a supermarket, 
δ
k
0 and  δ
k
1 are the parameters to be estimated, and εi is 
the error term (results are shown in table 5). 
Obviously, the estimated values of δ
k
0  and  δ
k
1 are 
nothing but the average price of the k-th product in 
supermarkets, and the difference between the average 
prices in traditional retail stores and in supermarkets, 
respectively. The tests show that for 7 out of the 14 
products the average price in the supermarkets was 
statistically significantly lower than that in traditional 
retail stores (in 5 cases at the 99% confidence level, in 
the remaining 2 cases at the 95% level), while the 
contrary never happens, since in the other 7 cases the 
two average prices are not statistically different. 
Table 6 allows us to compare the cost of baskets of 
products, instead of considering them one by one. 
Traditional retail stores, being much smaller in size, 
tend to carry a lower number of references than 
supermarkets; in fact, no traditional retail store carries 
all 14 food items, only two sell the full set but 
MILKTDM, and the basket of 10 products (that 
obtained by excluding MILKTDM, BABYFPLA, 
SPAGVOI and COFFEELAV) is sold by 10 stores 
only. Nevertheless, the information in table 6 provides 
useful indications, complementing those which 
emerged when products were considered individually. 
The lowest cost of each basket always occurs in a 
supermarket, but the same is also true for the highest 
cost. Beside the 13 products basket, which is sold by 
two traditional retail stores only, the average cost of 
the baskets considered is always lower in 
supermarkets, although the average savings are 
relatively small (between 1.7% and 2.5% of total 
expenditure). 
One interesting issue involves pricing decision 
behaviours by stores belonging to the same chain. 
Most consumers, especially among those devoting 
relatively little effort to their food shopping, tend to 
believe supermarkets belonging to the same chain 
offer identical, or very similar, prices. Theory, 
however, suggests the contrary, as this would imply 
that retail stores belonging to certain chains could be 
identified a priori as being cheaper than those 
belonging to certain other chains. To address this point 
table 7 provides information on price dispersion in 
supermarkets belonging to the 11 chains which in our 
sample have at least 6 stores; this means considering 
159 supermarkets out of the 249 covered by the 
survey. When average prices in each of the chains are 
compared with average prices across all supermarkets 
in the sample one finds out that no chain shows a 
lower (or a higher) than average price for all 14 items. 
The number of products offered at a higher than 
average price varies among the 11 chains between 4 
and 12. 58% of the average prices for the 14 products 
in the 11 chains are above the average calculated for 
each product across all supermarkets. However, the 
number of products sold at above or below average 
prices in a certain chain, alone, does not provide 
enough information to assess the advantage of 
shopping in that specific chain. Figure 8 gives the ratio 
between the average total cost of the basket of the 14 
products in each chain of stores and the average cost 
of the same basket calculated for all supermarkets in 
the sample, and the number of products sold in the   9 
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same chain at above average prices. A positive link 
between the two variables emerge. Nevertheless, it 
seems to us that this relationship cannot be taken as a 
general rule. In fact, one of the chains with the largest 
number of items (11 out of 14) sold at a price above 
the average shows an average expenditure for the 14 
products which is 2% below the average expenditure 
calculated across all supermarkets (SISA), and the 
largest expected savings (6%) occur in a chain where 7 
of the 14 products are sold at an above average price 
(STANDA) (table 7). This suggests (a) that different 
chains use different strategies in their pricing 
decisions, and (b) that at least some of those pricing a 
relatively large number of food items above average 
have other food items priced well below average, or, 
to put it differently, that chains offering (truly 
advantageous) promotional sales are, at the same time, 
often selling many other items at not-so-advantageous 
prices. This is consistent with the conclusions reached 
in Griffith et al. (2009, pp. 111-112), who found Tesco 
to be the supermarket chain where consumers saved 
the most, but, at the same time, 79 out of the 189 
product groups considered were sold at above average 
prices. 
 
D. Is price dispersion larger within supermarkets than 
in traditional food retailers? 
Supermarkets being engaged in more sophisticated 
pricing strategies than traditional retail stores, one 
would expect to find higher price dispersion among 
the former. However, this does not seem to be the 
case; in fact, on the contrary, the coefficients of 
variation of prices are higher in traditional retail stores 
for 10 of the 14 products and lower for three (in one 
case, BEERPERO, the two groups of stores show the 
same value of the coefficient) (table 4; figure 7). 
Furthermore, wider price dispersion is not 
systematically associated to products for which stores 
show higher average retail prices; in fact, this is the 
case only for 7 products, while in 6 cases the group of 
stores showing the highest coefficient of variation is 
the one with the lowest average price (table 4).  
The opposite result emerges when the coefficients 
of variations for the cost of the baskets considered in 
table 6 are compared. The higher dispersion of the cost 
of the baskets observed in supermarkets is not in 
contradiction with the lower dispersion observed in the 
same group of stores for individual prices, as it may be 
the result of more careful pricing. However, the small 
number of traditional retail stores selling the four 
baskets considered in the analysis suggests caution in 
comparing differences in the variability between the 
two groups.  
In general, price dispersion for individual products 
in supermarkets and traditional food retailers appears 
relatively close and not far from that observed for the 
entire sample. What remains to be seen is whether the 
determinants of price dispersions are the same in 
supermarkets and traditional food retailers, or if the 
similar price dispersion observed is the result of 
different factors/behaviours in the two groups of 
stores.  
Finally, it would be reasonable to expect price 
dispersion within stores belonging to the same chain to 
be smaller than that observed across all supermarkets. 
The results of our survey suggest that this is not 
necessarily the case. In fact, for 34% of the prices of 
the 14 products sold in the 11 supermarket chains with 
at least 6 stores in our sample, the coefficient of 
variation calculated for the stores belonging to the 
same chain (table 7) is larger than that calculated 
considering all supermarkets (table 4).  
E. Are prices and price dispersion higher in smaller 
and rural communities than in urban settings? 
In an urban setting, because of the greater density of 
stores, consumer search costs are definitely lower. 
Hence, one can expect both lower prices and lower 
price dispersion. Ambrose (1979) compared grocery 
prices in retail stores located in inner city, suburban 
and rural areas. His results show higher prices in retail 
stores located in rural areas, followed by those in 
suburban and inner city areas, respectively.  In table 8 
prices and price dispersion in the stores located in the 
urban area of the Cosenza-Rende conglomeration are 
compared with those in the rest of the sample, where 
most stores are located in smaller towns and rural 
areas of the region. 118 (27%) of the 437 retail stores 
in the sample fall in the urban area; the share of 
supermarkets in the two groups is practically the same 
(58% for the urban area, 56% in the rest of the 
sample).  
Average prices in the urban area are not 
systematically lower than those in smaller towns and 
rural areas. On the contrary, in fact, for 11 of the 14 
products the average price is higher in the urban area, 
and statistically significantly so at least at the 95%   10 
International EAAE-SYAL Seminar – Spatial Dynamics in Agri-food Systems  
confidence level in three cases (table 9).
 3 For only one 
of the three products for which the average price in the 
urban area is lower than in the rest of the region is the 
difference statistically significant (at the 99% 
confidence level). At average prices, the basket of the 
14 products in the food retail stores located in the 
urban area is 1.6% more expensive than in the rest of 
the region (it costs €30.61 vs. €30.14). 
However, on the contrary, price dispersion 
measured by the coefficients of variation is lower in 
the urban area for 9 of the 14 food products considered 
(table 8). Observed differences in price dispersion in 
the urban areas vis a vis smaller towns and rural areas 
are, in some cases, quite marked. 
These results suggest that, while the greater density 
of sellers in the urban area definitely does not translate 
into increased price competition among retailers and 
lower consumer prices, it does yield lower price 
dispersion. This means that differences in search costs 
across markets may have a limited impact on the level 
of prices, while sellers in the presence of lower search 
costs seem to be more careful in limiting price 
dispersion, which consumers may now detect more 
easily.  
F. Do low/high price setters remain so over time? 
Theory suggests that retailers are expected to vary 
over time the prices of the different goods they sell in 
opposite directions. In fact, as discussed above,   
temporal price dispersion is a necessary condition for 
spatial price dispersion, otherwise consumers would 
be able to identify from experience stores selling a 
given product at a lower price and no one would buy it 
from stores offering it a higher price (Varian, 1980). 
Lach (2002) found evidence of most stores in his 
sample falling over a 48 months period in both the 
lower and the upper quartiles of the price distribution 
of the three food products considered. 
In order to assess if this is also true in our case, and 
if so to what extent, prices surveyed in 2010 were 
compared with prices in 2009 for the 178 retailers in 
our sample (out of 437) which were involved in an 
identical survey conducted between April  2 and 5, 
2009. In Figure 9, for each of the 14 food products, 
normalized prices in 2010 are plotted against 
                                                           
3  The approach taken to assess the statistical significance of 
the difference between the two average prices is analogous 
to that used for the difference between average prices in 
supermarkets and traditional retail stores (table 5). 
normalized prices in the same store the previous year 
(the number of stores varies from product to product, 
because only stores which carried the product in both 
years are considered); if temporal price dispersion did 
not exist, in each graph all stores would lie on the 45° 
line crossing the origin.  
Observed over time pricing strategies do not show a 
negative relation between prices in 2009 and 2010, 
with stores who offered a given product at an above 
(below) average price in 2009 more likely to offer the 
same product at a below (above) average price one 
year later. On the contrary, in 13 out of the 14 
instances, retailers who offered the product at an 
above (below) average price in 2009 were more likely 
to do so again one year later (although a significant 
number of stores - those falling in the second and 
fourth quadrants of the graphs - did the opposite); this 
behavior is particularly evident for five of the 
products, while the relation is less marked for the 
other eight. 
In principle this result could be consistent with 
retailers consistently offering, over time, certain 
products at above average prices and others at below 
average price, without revealing an equally stable 
overall pricing profile, i.e. their prices consistently 
being, overall, either low or high. To check if this is 
actually the case we considered the same-store 
expenditure in 2009 and 2010 for a given basket of 
products. Even limiting the number of products to 10, 
only 23 of the 178 stores involved in the two surveys 
sold those products at the time of both surveys (figure 
10). Even with all the precaution suggested by the 
small number of stores, the indication which emerges 
is that those stores which charged, overall, relatively 
higher prices in 2009 were doing the same one year 
later. 
This result is consistent with those of Baylis and 
Perloff (2002) regarding non food products. 
A possible explanation is firm heterogeneity - in 
terms of the services they provide, such as number of 
references offered, opening hours, number of 
references, proximity, parking convenience and 
reputation - and consumer heterogeneity – in terms of 
their shopping preferences. 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
The aim of this paper has been to contribute to the 
empirical literature on price dispersion by assessing its 
extent and determinants for a group of perfectly   11 
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homogeneous food products. As far as we know, this 
is the first attempt to address the price dispersion issue 
in a retail market characterized by a marked 
heterogeneity of sellers as a result of the persistence of 
a large number of relatively small traditional food 
retailers, side by side with large supermarkets. 
Some of the results reached confirm in this specific 
market setting those obtained elsewhere, while others,  
in our opinion, may offer original insights to the 
empirical literature on price dispersion. 
 Although (i) the products considered are perfectly 
homogeneous and (ii) frequently purchased, (iii) the 
number of sellers high, and (iv) search costs relatively 
low, the observed price dispersion is quite high. Its 
magnitude has been found to be of the same order 
detected for food products by several others studies in 
very different environments, suggesting that the 
greater heterogeneity of firms (because of the 
persistence of a large number of traditional food retail 
stores) does not lead to increased price dispersion.  
The extent of price dispersion observed suggests 
that monopolistic competition prevails among sellers 
as a result of their heterogeneity in terms of services 
rendered. This is consistent with Carlson and MacAfee 
(1983). Further evidence of heterogeneity of firms’ 
characteristics which can be detected and appreciated 
by consumers (i.e. different from heterogeneity in 
operational and procurement costs, which is another 
factor which has been suggested to explain price 
dispersion) is provided by the circumstance that, in our 
study, many retailers selling at relatively high (low) 
prices in 2010 were doing the same one year earlier. 
High price dispersion in the presence of low search 
costs and frequently repeated purchases signal that 
these factors are counteracted in consumer decisions 
about searching by the relatively low prices of the 
commodities considered (which reduce the expected 
marginal benefits from search efforts). Sellers pricing 
behaviors suggest that consumers are more sensitive to 
absolute price differences than percentage ones, i.e. 
they are more interested in detecting a 10% price 
difference which translates in savings of 2€ than a 
50% price difference involving saving 50 cents. 
Promotional sales are found (here and elsewhere) to 
contribute in a significant way to price dispersion. 
Based on the results of our survey, however, we have 
been able to conclude that this does not have to be 
always the case. In fact, if the promotional sale is 
market-wide run by the manufacturer it reduces, rather 
than increases, price dispersion, while the contrary is 
true if the sale is the result of decisions taken by 
retailers.  
When prices in an urban area (where the spatial 
concentration of sellers is much higher and, hence, 
consumer search costs significantly lower) have been 
compared with those in smaller towns and rural areas 
differences in search costs proved to have a significant 
albeit limited positive effect on price dispersion. The 
potentially higher degree of competition deriving from 
the lower search costs and high density of sellers did 
not yield lower prices – on the contrary, on average, 
they where higher for 11 of the 14 products considered 
- confirming the hypothesis that food retail is an 
imperfectly competitive market.  
Supermarkets proved to be often, but not always, 
less expensive than traditional retailers. Yet, average 
savings associated to food shopping at supermarkets 
were extremely low. This helps explain the persistence 
of traditional retail stores: consumers keep shopping at 
them because they are often not significantly more 
expensive than supermarkets. In addition, if factors 
other than prices are considered, traditional retail 
stores provide fewer of the services many consumers 
ask for, and often of a lower quality, but they may 
provide other services which are not strong points for 
supermarkets, such as a convenient location and the 
social pleasure from shopping deriving from a more 
personal interaction. On the other hand, the economic 
squeeze traditional retailers face (between the 
constraint to contain prices, and their higher 
operational and acquisition costs) is proven by their 
rapid steady decline. 
Finally, the results of our study suggest that there is 
no one-rule-fits-them-all for firm strategic behaviors, 
as different groups of sellers behave differently in 
their pricing decisions. While explaining these 
differences and their motivations is beyond the scope 
of this study, our results show that such differences 
exist both between one store and another and between 
different supermarket chains.    
  In conclusion, our study confirms that significant 
price dispersion occurs even where, according to some 
of the theories proposed to explain it, it should be low. 
The products considered being homogeneous, 
purchases frequently repeated, the number of sellers 
high, and search costs relatively low did not suffice to 
keep price dispersion low. Based on the results 
presented in this study, what turned out to be more 
important in explaining price dispersion is the 
contemporaneous occurrence of retailer heterogeneity 
(in terms of services rendered), and consumer   12 
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heterogeneity (in terms of propensity to search and 
preferences regarding how to shop, i.e. “supermarket 
lovers” vs. “social shoppers”), which makes it possible 
for a monopolistic competition structure of the market 
to emerge and for a large number of traditional food 
retail stores to remain in business.   
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Fig. 2  Price dispersion: coefficients of variation (σ/μ x 100)   15 
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Fig. 3  Average prices and coefficients of variation for the 14 products.   16 
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Figure 4 Price frequency distribution for the 14 food products*   17 
International EAAE-SYAL Seminar – Spatial Dynamics in Agri-food Systems  



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4 Price frequency distribution for the 14 food products* 
 
 
*:   the extreme values of the intervals used to generate the frequency distributions are defined by using the same per cent differences from 
the average price for all products.    18 




































Fig. 5  Percentage of stores selling the product as a promotional sale and price coefficient of variation for  
13 food products (excluding MILKGRA*) 
 
 
*:   The percentage of stores offering MILKGRA at the promotional sale price is 83% and the price coefficient of variation is 
4.8% .   19 




















































Supermarkets Traditional retail stores
 
 
Fig. 6 Price dispersion in supermarkets vs. traditional retail stores: minimum and maximum prices.   20 



















































Supermarkets Traditional retail stores
 
 
Fig. 7  Price dispersion in supermarkets vs. traditional retail stores: average prices 
 and coefficients of variation.   21 











































Fig. 8  Number of average prices above the average calculated across all supermarkets in the sample  
and ratio between the average cost of the 14 products and that calculated across all supermarkets  
in the sample, by supermarket chain.  
   22 


















































































































































































































































                              (continued on next page)  
  
Figure 9  Same store normalized prices in 2009 and 2010 for the 14 food products   23 
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Figure 9  Same store normalized prices in 2009 and 2010 for the 14 food products   24 
























Cost in 2010 (€)
 
 
Figure 10  Same store cost of 10-product basket in 2009 and 2010 (23 stores) 
(all products but MILKTDM, BABYFPLA, SPAGVOI and COFFEELAV) 
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Label Description
1M I L K G R A Granarolo‐Centrali del latte di Calabria, Milk, whole, pastourized, 
"Alta qualità", plastic (PET) bottle, 1 lt
2 MILKTDM Torre di Mezzo, Milk, whole, pastourized, glass bottle, 0.75 lt
3M I L K P A R MParmalat, Milk, whole, UHT, "Bontà e gusto", plastic (PET) bottle, 1 lt
4Y O G Danone, Yogurt, skimmed, with fruit, "Vita snella", package of two, 
125 gr each
5 COCACOLA Coca cola, six can pack, 330 cc each
6N U T E L L A Ferrero, "Nutella" spread, glass container, 400 gr
7B E E R P E R O Peroni, beer, "Birra Peroni", three bottle pack, 330 cc each








Table 1  Food products considered in the survey  26 
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MILKGRA MILKTDM MILKPARM YOG COCACOLA NUTELLA BEERPERO WATERLEV COFEELAV COFFEEILLY SPAGBAR SPAGDEC SPAGVOI BABYFPLA
353 193 322 285 369 386 350 334 310 224 366 245 201 211
1,10 1,10 0,75 0,95 1,99 2,20 1,39 1,53 1,75 4,40 0,49 0,55 0,59 1,75
1,60 1,65 1,70 1,99 4,80 4,09 2,56 3,80 3,49 6,99 1,45 1,39 1,42 3,15
1,45 1,50 2,27 2,09 2,41 1,86 1,84 2,48 1,99 1,59 2,96 2,53 2,41 1,80
1,29 NA 0,75 0,95 2,93 2,21 1,39 1,92 1,89 5,45 0,49 0,69 NA 1,75
1,31 1,36 1,30 1,29 3,40 2,65 1,87 3,00 2,43 6,08 0,76 1,14 1,00 2,65
0,06 0,08 0,19 0,30 0,49 0,31 0,21 0,39 0,28 0,49 0,12 0,16 0,13 0,29
4,8% 6,2% 14,7% 23,5% 14,4% 11,6% 11,3% 12,9% 11,4% 8,1% 15,5% 14,4% 12,6% 10,9%
Number of prices surveyed for each product
Table 2   Price dispersion (prices in €)
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
Maximum price
Average price (μ) 
Minimum price
Standard deviation (б) 
Pmax / Pmin
Minimum "on sale" price
   27 
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all 14 products
13 products: all products 
but MILKTDM
12 products: all products 
but MILKTDM and 
BABYFPLA








15 29 40 60 82
27,64 26,23 23,73 22,47 20,19
31,89 30,50 27,75 27,02 24,43
1,15 1,16 1,17 1,20 1,21
29,51 28,01 25,67 24,63 22,09
1,08 1,02 1,06 1,10 1,06
3,6% 3,6% 4,1% 4,5% 4,8%
Average cost (μ) 
Standard deviation (б) 
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
Table 3  Cost dispersion of selected product baskets (costs in €)
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MILKGRA MILKTDM MILKPARM YOG COCACOLA NUTELLA BEERPERO WATERLEV COFEELAV COFFEEILLY SPAGBAR SPAGDEC SPAGVOI BABYFPLA
217 124 205 179 222 224 205 199 179 168 218 167 139 146
1,10 1,10 0,79 0,95 1,99 2,20 1,39 1,89 1,75 4,40 0,49 0,60 0,59 1,75
1,59 1,62 1,69 1,99 4,80 4,09 2,56 3,80 3,49 6,99 1,40 1,39 1,29 3,12
1,45 1,47 2,14 2,09 2,41 1,86 1,84 2,01 1,99 1,59 2,86 2,32 2,19 1,78
1,30 1,35 1,31 1,22 3,28 2,57 1,83 2,97 2,43 6,08 0,74 1,13 1,00 2,65
0,05 0,08 0,18 0,29 0,40 0,29 0,20 0,37 0,26 0,46 0,11 0,16 0,11 0,30
4,1% 5,6% 13,8% 23,8% 12,3% 11,1% 11,0% 12,6% 10,67% 7,6% 14,6% 13,9% 11,0% 11,3%
136 69 117 106 147 162 145 135 131 56 148 78 62 65
1,25 1,10 0,75 0,98 2,05 2,25 1,50 1,53 1,75 4,50 0,49 0,55 0,69 1,79
1,60 1,65 1,70 1,99 4,80 4,00 2,50 3,80 3,49 6,99 1,45 1,39 1,42 3,15
1,28 1,50 2,27 2,03 2,34 1,78 1,67 2,48 1,99 1,55 2,96 2,53 2,06 1,76
1,32 1,38 1,28 1,39 3,58 2,77 1,92 3,05 2,42 6,08 0,79 1,14 1,02 2,66
0,07 0,10 0,21 0,29 0,55 0,30 0,21 0,40 0,30 0,58 0,13 0,18 0,16 0,26
5,7% 7,0% 16,1% 21,1% 15,4% 10,9% 11,0% 13,2% 12,5% 9,5% 15,8% 15,5% 15,4% 9,9%
Number of prices surveyed for each product
Table 4  Price dispersion in supermarkets and in traditional retail stores (prices in €)




Average price (μ) 
Standard deviation (б) 
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
Supermarkets
Traditional retail stores




Average price (μ) 
Standard deviation (б) 
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Observations: 353 price MILKGRA Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =  0.0190 δ0 1,3030 0,00425 306,85 1,29469 1,31139
δ1(traditional retail stores) 0,0178 0,00684 2,61 0,00439 0,03130
Observations: 193 price MILKTDM Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 = 0.0186 δ0 1,3536 0,00747 181,14 1,33889 1,36837
δ1(traditional retail stores) 0,0238 0,01250 1,90 -0,00089 0,04841
Observations: 322 price MILKPARM Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =  0.0059 δ0 1,3147 0,01334 98,56 1,28844 1,34093
δ1(traditional retail stores) -0,0306 0,02213 -1,38 -0,07412 0,01296
Observations: 285 price YOG Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =   0.0733 δ0 1,2241 0,02182 56,10 1,18118 1,26708
δ1(traditional retail stores) 0,1693 0,03578 4,73 0,09884 0,23969
Observations: 369 price COCACOLA Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =   0.0882 δ0 3,2817 0,03140 104,53 3,21993 3,34341
δ1(traditional retail stores) 0,2963 0,04974 5,96 0,19848 0,39411
Observations: 386 price NUTELLA Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =   0.1035 δ0 2,5694 0,01957 131,30 2,53090 2,60785
δ1(traditional retail stores) 0,2011 0,03021 6,66 0,14173 0,26051
Observations: 350 price BEE RPE RO Coefficient Stand. E rror t 
R2 = 0.0455 δ0 1,8344 0,01441 127,26 1,80609 1,86279
δ1(traditional retail stores) 0,0912 0,02240 4,07 0,04717 0,13526
Observations: 334 price WATERLEV Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 = 0.0117 δ0 2,9660 0,02732 108,57 2,91229 3,01977
δ1(traditional retail stores) 0,0852 0,04297 1,98 0,00070 0,16975
Observations: 310 price COFFE E LAV Coefficient Stand. E rror t 
R2 =   0.0002 δ0 2,4332 0,02083 116,80 2,39219 2,47418
δ1(traditional retail stores) -0,0082 0,03205 -0,26 -0,07128 0,05483
Observations:  224 price COFFEEILLY Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =   0.0000 δ0 6,0829 0,03804 159,92 6,00790 6,15782
δ1(traditional retail stores) 0,0021 0,07608 0,03 -0,14778 0,15207
Observations: 366 price SPAGBAR Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =   0.0522 δ0 0,7394 0,00781 94,66 0,72400 0,75472
δ1(traditional retail stores) 0,0550 0,01228 4,48 0,03081 0,07912
Observations: 245 price SPAGDEC Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =  0.0005 δ0 1,1338 0,01270 89,29 1,10882 1,15885
δ1(traditional retail stores) 0,0077 0,02250 0,34 -0,03662 0,05204
Observations: 201 price SPAGVOI Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 = 0.0081 δ0 0,9968 0,01070 93,16 0,97566 1,01786
δ1(traditional retail stores) 0,0245 0,01927 1,27 -0,01346 0,06252
Observations: 211 price BABYFPLA Coefficient Stand. E rror t 
R2 =  0.0002 δ0 2,6477 0,02394 110,59 2,60047 2,69487
δ1(traditional retail stores) 0,0085 0,04313 0,20 -0,07655 0,09352
Confidence interval (95%)
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all 14 products 13 products: all products 
but MILKTDM
12 products: all products 
but MILKTDM and 
BABYFPLA








15 27 34 51 72
27,64 26,23 23,73 22,47 20,19
31,89 30,50 27,75 27,02 24,43
1,15 1,16 1,17 1,20 1,21
29,51 28,02 25,60 24,54 22,03
1,08 1,05 1,09 1,13 1,09
3,6% 3,7% 4,3% 4,6% 4,9%
0 2691 0
… 27,48 24,93 24,03 21,68
… 28,25 27,00 26,28 23,67
… 1,03 1,08 1,09 1,09
… 27,87 26,03 25,13 22,59
… 0,54 0,85 0,79 0,71
… 1,9% 3,3% 3,1% 3,1%
Minimum cost
Table 6  Cost dispersion of selected product baskets in supermarkets and traditional retail stores (costs in €)




Average cost (μ) 
Standard deviation (б) 
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
Supermarkets
Traditional retail stores
Number of retail stores selling the specific basket
Maximum cost
Cmax / Cmin
Average cost (μ) 
Standard deviation (б) 
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)  31 
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MILKGRA MILKTDM MILKPARM YOG COCACOLA NUTELLA BEERPERO WATERLEV COFEELAV COFFEEILLY SPAGBAR SPAGDEC SPAGVOI BABYFPLA
1,30 1,30 1,35 1,17 3,31 2,57 1,62 2,84 2,31 5,86 0,75 1,12 0,95 2,64
0,05 0,05 0,11 0,29 0,44 0,39 0,20 0,35 0,23 0,41 0,08 0,10 0,07 0,28
4,2% 3,8% 7,9% 25,1% 13,3% 15,0% 12,6% 12,3% 10,0% 6,9% 10,2% 9,2% 7,4% 10,4%
1,30 1,32 1,18 1,11 3,15 2,47 1,88 3,09 2,61 6,18 0,80 1,16 0,99 2,80
0,04 0,05 0,13 0,20 0,14 0,09 0,11 0,33 0,47 0,31 0,18 0,18 0,05 0,09
3,1% 3,9% 11,0% 18,5% 4,6% 3,7% 6,0% 10,5% 18,1% 5,0% 22,3% 15,4% 4,9% 3,4%
1,30 1,38 1,30 1,03 3,27 2,43 2,00 2,93 2,39 6,43 0,75 1,18 1,03 2,17
0,05 0,02 0,17 0,13 0,33 0,09 0,09 0,33 0,21 0,19 0,05 0,13 0,08 0,49
4,0% 1,3% 12,7% 12,5% 10,0% 3,6% 4,4% 11,2% 8,6% 2,9% 6,0% 10,9% 7,3% 22,5%
1,32 1,38 1,30 1,15 3,18 2,51 1,85 2,82 2,61 5,83 0,60 1,18 1,05 2,60
0,08 0,02 0,15 0,31 0,39 0,26 0,23 0,37 0,38 0,35 0,25 0,12 0,13 0,32
6,1% 1,6% 11,7% 26,7% 12,4% 10,2% 12,3% 13,2% 14,6% 6,0% 40,9% 10,4% 12,7% 12,3%
1,31 1,33 1,16 1,31 3,33 2,65 1,90 3,19 2,50 6,11 0,78 1,19 1,10 2,65
0,04 0,11 0,20 0,33 0,28 0,19 0,16 0,26 0,25 0,52 0,11 0,08 0,11 0,19
3,0% 8,2% 17,5% 25,0% 8,4% 7,0% 8,2% 8,1% 10,0% 8,6% 13,7% 6,9% 10,4% 7,2%
1,31 na 1,46 1,39 3,30 2,54 1,90 3,23 2,51 6,08 0,76 1,18 1,01 2,75
0,05 na 0,09 0,38 0,15 0,19 0,16 0,22 0,13 0,70 0,08 0,17 0,06 0,19
3,9% na 6,1% 27,4% 4,6% 7,6% 8,3% 6,7% 5,0% 11,6% 10,1% 14,4% 6,1% 7,0%
Standard deviation (б)
Table 7  Price dispersion in supermarkets by chain (only those with at least 6 stores in the sample are considered) (prices in €)
DESPAR (31 stores)
Average price (μ) 
Standard deviation (б)
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
CONAD (28 stores)
Average price (μ) 
Standard deviation (б)
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
GS (17 stores)
Average price (μ) 
Standard deviation (б)
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
SIDIS (17 stores)
Average price (μ) 
Standard deviation (б)
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
CRAI  (15 stores)
Average price (μ) 
Standard deviation (б)
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
SISA (12 stores)
Average price (μ) 
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
 (continued on next page)   32 
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1,29 1,40 1,39 1,29 3,38 2,70 1,88 3,00 2,42 6,14 0,76 1,17 1,04 2,44
0,00 0,01 0,28 0,27 0,12 0,17 0,07 0,10 0,15 0,47 0,03 0,03 0,07 0,34
0,0% 0,4% 20,2% 21,0% 3,5% 6,5% 3,7% 3,5% 6,2% 7,7% 4,4% 2,4% 6,8% 13,9%
1,29 1,40 1,39 1,38 3,63 2,78 1,89 3,16 2,47 6,19 0,79 1,02 1,01 2,72
0,00 … 0,12 0,19 0,48 0,55 0,29 0,32 0,15 0,80 0,14 0,30 0,18 0,21
0,0% … 8,7% 13,5% 13,3% 19,7% 15,6% 10,1% 5,9% 13,0% 17,9% 29,7% 17,5% 7,8%
1,29 1,39 1,40 1,20 3,50 2,62 1,92 3,07 2,43 6,05 0,73 1,07 0,95 2,63
0,00 0,01 0,24 0,22 0,48 0,10 0,23 0,11 0,19 0,67 0,10 0,22 0,21 0,12
0,0% 1,1% 17,0% 18,3% 13,7% 3,6% 12,2% 3,4% 7,9% 11,1% 14,2% 20,7% 22,3% 4,7%
1,29 1,35 1,20 1,16 3,55 2,65 1,89 2,69 2,52 6,45 0,77 na 0,98 2,71
0,00 0,01 0,28 0,29 0,04 0,05 0,00 0,33 0,05 0,06 0,02 na 0,15 0,38
0,0% 0,4% 23,2% 25,2% 1,2% 2,0% 0,0% 12,3% 2,0% 1,0% 2,9% na 15,0% 14,1%
1,31 1,49 1,39 1,16 2,86 2,59 1,82 2,66 2,43 5,42 0,75 1,02 1,03 2,32
0,04 … 0,19 0,23 0,47 0,15 0,23 0,27 0,04 0,61 0,22 0,11 0,19 0,46
3,4% … 14,0% 19,9% 16,5% 5,7% 12,5% 10,0% 1,5% 11,2% 29,6% 10,4% 18,5% 19,7%
1,30 1,34 1,31 1,19 3,29 2,56 1,84 2,98 2,46 6,07 0,75 1,15 1,00 2,64
0,05 0,06 0,18 0,28 0,35 0,26 0,21 0,34 0,29 0,49 0,14 0,15 0,10 0,29
3,6% 4,6% 13,8% 23,7% 10,7% 10,3% 11,5% 11,4% 11,9% 8,0% 19,1% 13,1% 10,3% 11,1%
1,30 1,35 1,31 1,22 3,28 2,57 1,83 2,97 2,43 6,08 0,74 1,13 1,00 2,65
0,05 0,08 0,18 0,29 0,40 0,29 0,20 0,37 0,26 0,46 0,11 0,16 0,11 0,30
4,1% 5,6% 13,8% 23,8% 12,3% 11,1% 11,0% 12,6% 10,67% 7,6% 14,6% 13,9% 11,0% 11,3%
Standard deviation (б)
A&O (9 stores)
Average price (μ) 
Standard deviation (б)
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
SIGMA (9 stores)
Average price (μ) 
Standard deviation (б)
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
DOK (8 stores)
Average price (μ) 
 (continues from previous page)
Standard deviation (б)
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
PAM (7 stores)
Average price (μ) 
Standard deviation (б)
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
STANDA (6 stores)
Average price (μ) 
Standard deviation (б)
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
Total (159 stores above)
Average price (μ) 
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
Total (249 stores, all supermarkets in the sample)
Average price (μ) 
Standard deviation (б)
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
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MILKGRA MILKTDM MILKPARM YOG COCACOLA NUTELLA BEERPERO WATERLEV COFEELAV COFFEEILLY SPAGBAR SPAGDEC SPAGVOI BABYFPLA
103 62 86 72 97 97 87 91 76 61 85 49 41 47
1,10 1,11 0,75 0,95 2,50 2,20 1,48 2,10 1,95 4,49 0,49 0,70 0,59 1,75
1,49 1,45 1,69 1,99 4,80 4,05 2,49 3,60 3,49 6,90 1,00 1,36 1,35 3,15
1,35 1,31 2,25 2,09 1,92 1,84 1,68 1,71 1,79 1,54 2,04 1,94 2,29 1,80
1,30 1,35 1,32 1,25 3,50 2,66 1,92 3,02 2,46 6,17 0,77 1,18 1,02 2,69
0,039 0,058 0,199 0,305 0,487 0,315 0,213 0,328 0,235 0,392 0,075 0,134 0,135 0,341
2,97% 4,26% 15,14% 24,36% 13,92% 11,83% 11,10% 10,85% 9,57% 6,35% 9,74% 11,35% 13,25% 12,67%
250 131 236 213 272 289 263 243 234 163 281 196 160 164
1,10 1,10 0,79 0,95 1,99 2,20 1,39 1,53 1,75 4,40 0,49 0,55 0,69 1,75
1,60 1,65 1,70 1,99 4,80 4,09 2,56 3,80 3,49 6,99 1,45 1,39 1,42 3,12
1,45 1,50 2,15 2,09 2,41 1,86 1,84 2,48 1,99 1,59 2,96 2,53 2,06 1,78
1,32 1,37 1,30 1,30 3,36 2,65 1,86 2,99 2,42 6,05 0,76 1,13 1,00 2,64
0,070 0,094 0,189 0,302 0,486 0,307 0,208 0,407 0,291 0,521 0,128 0,169 0,124 0,272
5,32% 6,85% 14,51% 23,23% 14,45% 11,59% 11,20% 13,61% 11,99% 8,62% 16,94% 15,02% 12,42% 10,30%
Maximum price
Pmax / Pmin
Average price (μ) 
Standard deviation (б) 
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
Minimum price
Table 8   Price dispersion in the urban area (Cosenza-Rende) and in the rest of the sample (smaller towns and rural areas) (prices in €)
Urban area (Cosenza-Rende)




Average price (μ) 
Standard deviation (б) 
Coefficient of variation (%) (б/μ x 100)
Rest of the sample
Number of prices surveyed for each product
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Observations: 353 price MILKGRA Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =  0.0198 δ0 1,3156 0,00396 332,22 1,3078 1,3234
δ1 (urban area) -0,0195 0,00732 -2,66 -0,0340 -0,0050
Observations: 193 price MILKTDM Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 = 0.0041 δ0 1,3658 0,00732 186,58 1,3513 1,3803
δ1 (urban area) -0,0114 0,01292 -0,88 -0,0369 0,0141
Observations: 322 price MILKPARM Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =  0.0013 δ0 1,2994 0,01246 104,29 1,2748 1,3240
δ1 (urban area) 0,0158 0,02411 0,66 -0,0318 0,0634
Observations: 285 price YOG Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =   0.0047 δ0 1,2991 0,02073 62,67 1,2582 1,3400
δ1 (urban area) -0,0476 0,04124 -1,15 -0,1290 0,0338
Observations: 369 price COCACOLA Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =   0.0142 δ0 3,3650 0,02949 114,11 3,3068 3,4232
δ1 (urban area) 0,1322 0,05752 2,30 0,0186 0,2458
Observations: 386 price NUTELLA Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =   0.0003 δ0 2,6509 0,01819 145,73 2,6150 2,6868
δ1 (urban area) 0,0113 0,03629 0,31 -0,0604 0,0830
Observations: 350 price BE E RPE RO Coefficient Stand. E rror t 
R2 = 0.0190 δ0 1,8555 0,01290 143,84 1,8300 1,8810
δ1 (urban area) 0,0672 0,02588 2,60 0,0161 0,1183
Observations: 334 price WATERLEV Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 = 0.0013 δ0 2,9921 0,02485 120,41 2,9430 3,0412
δ1 (urban area) 0,0309 0,04761 0,65 -0,0631 0,1249
Observations: 310 price COFFE E LAV Coefficient Stand. E rror t 
R2 =   0.0025 δ0 2,4228 0,01812 133,71 2,3870 2,4586
δ1 (urban area) 0,0325 0,03671 0,89 -0,0400 0,1050
Observations:  224 price COFFEEILLY Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =   0.0129 δ0 6,0493 0,03837 157,66 5,9735 6,1251
δ1 (urban area) 0,1253 0,07352 1,70 -0,0199 0,2705
Observations: 366 price SPAGBAR Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =   0.0025 δ0 0,7584 0,00706 107,42 0,7445 0,7723
δ1 (urban area) 0,0139 0,01464 0,95 -0,0150 0,0428
Observations: 245 price SPAGDEC Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =  0.0169 δ0 1,1257 0,01163 96,79 1,1027 1,1487
δ1 (urban area) 0,0531 0,02599 2,04 0,0018 0,1044
Observations: 201 price SPAGVOI Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 = 0.0020 δ0 1,0015 0,01000 100,15 0,9818 1,0213
δ1 (urban area) 0,0139 0,02215 0,63 -0,0298 0,0576
Observations: 211 price BABYFPLA Coefficient Stand. Error t 
R2 =  0.0055 δ0 2,6388 0,02253 117,12 2,5943 2,6833











Table 9  Testing average price differences between urban area (Cosenza-Rende) and rest of the sample 
(smaller towns and rural areas)
Confidence interval (95%)
Confidence interval (95%)
Confidence interval (95%)
Confidence interval (95%)
 